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A Guide to the Microsoft Case

September 1998 -- Robert A. Levy, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, received his Ph.D. in finance and investments from the American University in 1966. For the next twenty-five years, he ran CDA Investment Technologies, Inc., a major provider of financial information and software. During that time, Levy wrote a book on the application of quantitative techniques to the stock market, as well as several dozen articles on investment. In 1991, Levy left his position as chief executive officer of CDA and returned to school, earning a J.D. in 1994 from George Mason University Law School, where he was chief articles editor of the law review. He went on to clerk for two years, first for Judge Royce Lamberth of the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., and then for Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Along the way, Levy wrote several law review articles, such as "Calculating Tort Damages for Lost Future Earnings," "The Prudent Investor Rule," and "An Equal Protection Analysis of the Davis-Bacon Act." Since joining the Cato Institute in 1996, Levy's principal research interests have been tort law, antitrust, financial markets, and constitutional issues. In 1997, he wrote the monograph "Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing out the Rule of Law" (Policy Analysis no. 275) and in 1998 he wrote a second monograph, "Microsoft and the Browser Wars: Fit To be Tied" (Policy Analysis no. 296, available on-line ). He has also published numerous articles and op-eds in such magazines and newspapers as National Review, The Weekly Standard, The Washington Post, and USA Today. In addition to his position at Cato, Levy is an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and a director at the Institute for Justice.

Sep 2, 1998
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Objectivists and Libertarians

I thank Bob Bidinotto for his many generous remarks about Libertarianism: A Primer , and I congratulate Bidinotto and the Institute for Objectivist Studies for their continuing commitment to a constructive dialogue between Objectivists and those libertarians who are not Objectivists. David BoazI might begin by noting that the very notion of a conflict “between libertarians and Objectivists” is flawed, as it seems to me that all Objectivists are necessarily libertarians, though not all libertarians are Objectivists. That is, anyone who believes in individual rights, free enterprise, and strictly limited government—and I assume that includes all Objectivists—is a libertarian. An Objectivist libertarian might well not belong to any particular party and might part company with some other libertarians on a wide range of philosophical and other issues, but at the level of political philosophy Objectivists are libertarians. And that gets us the crux of our disagreement. Should all libertarians be Objectivists? Or, put another way, must libertarianism rest on the Objectivist philosophical system? I believe that libertarianism, as a political movement and a political philosophy, is a sort of coalition. Libertarianism is compatible with a wide variety of philosophical, ethical, and religious beliefs. It is clearly compatible with Objectivism. It is also compatible with most religious faiths, as many libertarian Jews, Catholics, evangelical Protestants, and Muslims can attest. And certainly there are libertarians who feel a primary moral commitment to the value of individual freedom itself.

Aug 2, 1997
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